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Paliotta v. State Dep’t of Corrections, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 58 (Sept. 14, 2017)1
CIVIL APPEAL: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Summary
The Court determined it must consider the sincere religious beliefs of the individual when
evaluating claims under the Free Exercise Clause and the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). It is improper to evaluate those claims under the
centrality test, which attempts to determine if the individual’s beliefs are central to a tenant of the
religion in question. Once the sincere belief is shown, the courts must then fully examine the
remaining considerations under the Free Exercise Clause and the RLUIPA.
Background
Appellant, Gilbert Jay Paliotta, is incarcerated at the Ely State Prison. Paliotta filed the
necessary form to declare himself a Thelemist with the Department of Corrections. Paliotta then
contacted the chaplain at the prison to arrange a traditional Egyptian diet that would be in
accordance with his religious beliefs. The prison chaplain suggested that he should instead request
a kosher diet: the diet available in the prison most suited to his needs. Paliotta submitted his
request. Later that month, Paliotta submitted an additional request stating that he had not yet heard
back regarding his initial request. A month later, he submitted a third request to follow-up on the
initial request. This additional request outlined why he requested a kosher diet, and stated that it
should be provided in accordance with his faith. The prison eventually denied these requests.
Paliotta submitted an informal grievance again requesting a religious diet. The prison again
denied his request. The prison maintained that under the Department of Corrections regulations, a
kosher diet was not included as a religious consideration for the Thelemist religion. Paliotta filed
two additional grievances and challenged the denial because the prison was already providing
kosher meals to some inmates who were not Jewish. Those grievances were also denied.
Paliotta filed suit against the Nevada Department of Corrections and the Warden, Renee
Barker. In this suit, Paliotta argues that the denial of the religious diet violated the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment, RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc, and the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Both parties filed opposing motions for summary judgment. The
district court granted the State’s motion stating that the requested diet was not central to the
Thelemic faith. Paliotta appealed.
Discussion
Free Exercise Clause and RLUIPA claims in general
In order to show a valid claim under the Free Exercise Clause, the plaintiff must show that
that the “proffered belief [is] sincerely held; and that claim [is] rooted in religious belief, not in
purely secular philosophical concerns.”2 However, both the inherent nature of confinement and
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institutional objectives limit the protections offered to an inmate under the Free Exercise Clause.3
In comparison, in order to show a valid RLUIP claim, the plaintiff must show that they participate
in a religious exercise, and that the State’s actions have substantially burdened that exercise.4
Standard of review
District court orders granting summary judgment are reviewed de novo. 5 The court must
review all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine whether there
are any genuine issues of material fact.6
The district court erred in concluding that Paliotta’s Free Exercise Clause claim failed as a
matter of law
The district court determined that Paliotta was in fact sincere in his Thelemic beliefs, a
point that the State did not dispute. The point at issue was whether the dietary request was related
to those sincere religious beliefs.
Paliotta’s dietary request was related to his sincere Thelemic beliefs
The State argued that Paliotta was simply trying to use the court to receive better food.
They also argued that Paliotta’s requests were insincere because he requested two completely
different types of food on separate occasions. Paliotta contended that the requested diet was
important to his faith, and that he only asked for a different modification due to the prison
chaplain’s suggestions.
In Shakur, the courts determined that only the sincerity of the individual’s beliefs need to
be considered when evaluating whether a claim falls under the Free Exercise Clause.7 Further, the
court does not and should not consider whether that belief is a central tenant of the religion in
question.8
Here, the district court determined that Paliotta’s request for a kosher diet should be denied
because consuming a kosher diet was not central to the Thelema religion. Therefore, Paliotta’s
Free Exercise claim failed. This was an error because the court evaluated the claim under the
centrality test rather than the sincere belief test.
Paliotta established a prima facie showing that he believed the kosher diet was important
to his faith. He showed a sincere belief that the diet was related to practicing his religion. Paliotta
was therefore able to show that he was not only entitled to First Amendment protection, but also
that his claims should have been evaluated under the Free Exercise Clause and the Equal Protection
Clause.
The district court erred in concluding that Paliotta’s RLUIPA claim failed as a matter of law
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The district court incorrectly utilized the Free Exercise Clause analysis with the RLUIPA
analysis stating that both failed as a matter of law. However, the two have different standards for
establishing a prima facia case.
Under RLUIPA, the plaintiff must establish that he wanted to “engage in (1) a religious
exercise (2) motivated by a sincerely held belief, which exercise (3) is subject to a substantial
burden imposed by the government.”9 The purpose behind this to include a broad protection of
religious exercise.10
The State conceded that Paliotta was sincere in his Thelemic beliefs, but maintained that
the kosher or Egyptian diet was unrelated to those beliefs and so, not a religious exercise. Paliotta
argued that the diet was a necessary part of his religion, and that the State was imposing a
substantial burden on his religious practice by withholding the diet.
Paliotta’s dietary requests constituted a “religious exercise” under RLUIPA
The State argued that the requested diet was not a “religious exercise”. Paliotta was
insistent that the diet was a “religious exercise” under his Thelemic religion. The parties bitterly
disputed what constitutes a “religious exercise”.
A “religious exercise” is “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central
to, a system of religious belief.” 11 In Koger, the courts applied that standard to another Thelemic
inmate who was requesting an alternate diet.12 That court determined that the modified diet was a
“religious exercise rooted in sincerely held beliefs.”13
Here, Paliotta established a prima facie showing that he believed that the kosher diet was
important to his sincerely held Thelemic beliefs. Also, Paliotta showed that the diet was a religious
exercise in the furtherance of those sincerely held beliefs. Paliotta’s religion was the cause of his
desire for the diet. Paliotta was able to show text from a Thelemic holy book which addressed
dietary restrictions as well as historical evidence linking his beliefs with Judaism.
The broad nature of RLUIPA allows for individual interpretations of religions and
individual practices of those religions. The district court was incorrect when it attempted to limit
Paliotta's religious practice.
Paliotta’s religious exercise was substantially burdened by the State
The State maintained that the diet was directly related to a tenant of the Thelemic religion.
Therefore, the State believed that the refusal to provide the meal was not a substantial burden on
Paliotta’s ability to practice his religion. Paliotta argued that the State’s refusal to provide a kosher
diet was a substantial burden on his ability to exercise his religion.
Under RLUIPA, the state may not “impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise”
of an inmate.14 In Warsoldier, the court defines substantial burden as denying an individual a
benefit which then forces that individual to act in a way that violates their beliefs.15
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Paliotta was forced to eat a diet that was not in compliance with his religion in order to
meet his basic living needs. Unfortunately, this decision to eat in order to survive also made him
violate his religious beliefs. This forced modification of his behavior was a substantial burden on
Paliotta. The State prevented Paliotta from fully engaging in his religion. It is irrelevant that there
is a question as to whether or not that diet is a known tenant to the religion. It is only relevant that
the State’s action forced Paliotta to violate his religious beliefs as he practices them. The State’s
denial of the requested diet was a substantial burden upon Paliotta’s ability to practice his religion.
Issues unresolved in the district court
The district court erroneously granted summary judgment in favor of the State regarding
Paliotta’s Free Exercise Clause and RLUIPA claims. By doing so, the district court did not fully
examine whether or not the denial of the kosher diet was related to legitimate penological
interests.16 The district court also did not consider whether the denial of the diet was in support of
a government interest and the least restrictive way of achieving that interest. Finally, the district
could did not adequately consider Paliotta’s Equal Protection Claim. Upon remand, the district
court must address these issues that it failed to do so previously.
Conclusion
The Court determined that Paliotta provided a prima facie showing that his religious beliefs
were in fact sincere beliefs related to the religion that he was actively practicing. Therefore,
Paliotta was entitled to the protections offered under the Free Exercise Clause and RLUIPA.
Accordingly, the district court erred when it dismissed Paliotta’s case on a motion for summary
judgment. The Court reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case for proper review of
the all of the claims.
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